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The Role of Local Law
and Local Adjudications
in Federal Tax Controversiest
Richard B. Stephens*
James J. Freeland**
INTRODUCTION
Complexity is the price we pay for our cherished federal system
of government with its parallel structures of state and federal laws
and state and federal courts. Such complexity is nowhere more ap-
parent than in litigation concerning the imposition of federal taxes.
Stated broadly, two ever-present problems are: (1) What law con-
trols, state' or federal? and (2) What court, state or federal, de-
termines the application of such law? Sometimes these questions
are susceptible of easy solution; but at other times, perhaps par-
ticularly in cases involving the imposition of federal taxes on es-
tates and trusts, the decided cases offer no certain guide to the
correct answers.
The ambitious objective of this discussion is to attempt to bring
down to the irreducible minimum the tax uncertainties inherent in
our state and federal parallelism. The path of judicial decisions in
this area is strewn with red herrings, spurious principles tossed off
f No part of this Article may be reproduced without the express permis-
sion of the authors and of the Minnesota Law Review.
* Professor of Law, University of Florida.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. If it is decided that state law controls, a further irksome question
may be: The law of what state? We do not deal with this conflict of
laws problem. For a discussion in this context, see 1 MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 10.07 (1959).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
as determinative of controversies and sound principles questionably
applied. Thus, particularly with regard to the second facet of the
problem-what court, state or federal, determines the application
of state law-an analysis and synthesis of the cases is not enough;
a fresh identification of the principles that should control and a
suggestion concerning the way they should be applied seem nec-
essary.
I. THE FEDERAL TAX SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE LAW
The concurrent roles of state and federal law with respect to
federal taxation have never been more succinctly expressed than in
Morgan v. Commissioner,2 where the court said: "State law creates
legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what
interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed."' The first part of
this observation is accurate, because under our Constitution the
great residual lawmaking authority is left with the states. The in-
stances of federal establishment of rights and interests, while nu-
merous and possibly growing,4 are comparatively only a few
threads in the entire fabric of juridical relationships. Quantitatively,
the important authorities are the legislative, judicial, and adminis-
trative pronouncements at the state level. This is especially true
since the repudiation in 1938 of a federal general common law.5
Unfortunately, the second part of the Morgan dictum-that the
federal tax laws designate what locally created interests and rights
shall be taxed-is an over-simplification and at best a key to
doors that are already open. But, even here, the dictum is a force-
ful reminder that federal taxation is never practiced in a vacuum;
it operates within the framework of established commercial and
social structures of the community.
The controlling aspect of state law can best be examined by,
first, dealing with some settled principles; second, considering in-
2. 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
3. Id. at 80.
4. Successful private litigation under the federal securities laws may be
working toward a federalization of corporate law, at least with respect to
corporations subject to such laws. See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
931-1036 (2d ed. 1961), discussing private litigation under § 14 of the
Securities Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958),
and Regulation X-14 thereunder, and 3 Loss, op. cit. supra at 1757-1805,
discussing private litigation under § 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 and
Rule lOb-5 thereunder.
5. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938):
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power
to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
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stances of express reference to state law in the taxing statutes; third,
appraising the possibility of implied reference to state law; and,
finally, exploring a penumbra in which judicial action, seemingly
sound, is difficult to square with established doctrine. This ap-
proach will lead us from the relatively simple to the more complex
problems in this area and serve as a basis for discussion later of the
effect of prior adjudication in the state courts.
A. SETTLED PRINCIPLES
It may be said at the outset that any reference to legal interests
and rights created by state law, possibly affecting federal tax lia-
bility, is a reference to matters of substance and not to mere form,
labels, or nomenclature. The Supreme Court emphasized this in
the Morgan case,' saying: "If it is found in a given case that an
interest or right created by local law was the object intended to be
taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given
to the interest or right by state law."7 Thus, locally created re-
lationships may be significant but not local characterization. It
should quickly be added, however, that a disregard of the local
label in favor of the substantive rights created may work to the tax-
payer's benefit, as in Lyeth v. Hoey.s In that case, this settled
proposition was invoked, two years before the Morgan decision,
to exclude from gross income an amount received by an heir un-
der a settlement of a will contest.
In the Lyeth case, the Court had to decide whether an amount
received by the taxpayer upon settlement of a suit contesting the
validity of his grandmother's will was taxable or was excluded
from gross income as an amount received by "inheritance." 9 For
state death tax purposes, Massachusetts did not consider amounts
received upon such settlements to be acquired by inheritance. How-
ever, the Supreme Court rested its decision in favor of the exclu-
sion on the substance of the taxpayer's interest created by state
law, not the descriptive terms used in Massachusetts to identify
such interest, saying:
6. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
7. Id. at 81. See also Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir.
1959). A long-time problem has been the proper tax classification of busi-
ness organizations. Whatever the difficulties involved in this, it is at least
clear that local characterization of an organization as a trust, a partnership,
a corporation, or a "hambangerino" is not determinative of its federal tax
status. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-1(c) (1961).
8. 305 U.S. 188 (1938). See also United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418
(9th Cir. 1954).
9. The federal taxing statute has long excluded from gross income
amounts received by "inheritance." See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 102.
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Petitioner's status as heir was . . . determined by the law of Massa-
chusetts.... But when the contestant is an heir and a valid compromise
agreement has been made and there is a distribution to the heir from
the decedent's estate accordingly, the question whether what the heir
has thus received has been "acquired by inheritance" within the mean-
ing of the federal statute necessarily is a federal question. It is not
determined by local characterization. 10
The meaning of a term in a federal statute is always a federal
question, even though the application of the term to a specific set
of facts usually raises questions of relationships locally established.
This is a settled principle which, when applicable, renders state
law at least in part irrelevant in the decision of a tax controversy.
A further clear example is the treatment of the term "gift" in the
imposition of federal taxes on transfers of property by gift" as
raising a question of meaning not governed by local concepts re-
garding gifts.' The principle does no violence to either the tenth
amendment or the Erie doctrine.
Moreover, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion 3 nullifies local laws that conflict with valid federal statutes.
Thus, a state exemption statute cannot place property beyond the
reach of the plenary taxing power of the federal government. 4
Nor can a state statute that frees property from the claims of credi-
tors, generally, preclude the collection of federal taxes from such
property, unless Congress chooses to give such effect to the state
statute.'15
B. ExPREss REFERENCE TO STATE LAW
It must be conceded that the classification adopted here, while
convenient, is not flawless. We have suggested as relatively well
settled three basic propositions: (1) that state law may be signifi-
cant only as regards matters of substance, not form; (2) that inter-
pretation of a federal statutory term raises a federal question; and
(3) that the supremacy clause is as applicable here as in any area
of the law. None of this, however, is inconsistent with the notion
10. 305 U.S. at 193. Cf. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956)
concerning the meaning of "children" in the Copyright Act, 61 Stat. 652
(1947); 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
11. INT. REV. CODE op 1954, § 2501(a).
12. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); STEPHENS & MARR,
THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs 329 (1959).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
14. Estate of Faber, 40 B.T.A. 1070 (1939); Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b)
(1961).
15. Compare Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958), with United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). Cf. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S.
211 (1955).
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that Congress has wide discretion in adopting or rejecting local
law as controlling in federal tax cases. When Congress exercises
this discretion directly by express provision in a taxing statute,
few problems arise.
In the trust provisions of the 1954 Code when "income" is used
without other qualifying words, 6 the term is defined in the Code
to mean "the amount of income of the estate or trust for the taxable
year determined under the terms of the governing instrument and
applicable local law.'1 7 In this and other such circumstances that
need not be detailed,'" there can be no reasonable argument that
federal law controls regardless of local legal principles. If, as
here, Congress chooses to defer to local law, the tax result, or a
part of it as in this example, is determined by local law.
In contrast, Congress can and often does expressly reject local
legal concepts for tax purposes. For example, most state corpora-
tion laws do not permit the payment of so-called "nimble divi-
dends," dividends paid out of the earnings of an accounting period
without regard to the question whether capital is impaired.' 9 But
Congress subjects to ordinary income rates as dividends any dis-
tributions out of accumulated or current earnings,2" rendering ir-
relevant the question whether a distribution could qualify as a divi-
dend under local law. In this instance and numerous others in
which local law is rejected, which need not be detailed here,2'
resort to local principles is of course futile. Not only do local con-
cepts, such as dividend restrictions, not control; they have no bear-
ing whatever on the decision of the federal tax controversy.
16. E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 643(b).
17. Ibid. This does not mean that local law determines whether amounts
received by a trust will be subjected to federal income taxation; the pro-
vision bears more on the question whether such amounts will be taxed
initially to the trust or to the beneficiaries.
18. E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(a) (3) imposes estate tax
liability with respect to certain exercises of powers of appointment, whether
general or not, if such powers are exercised "by creating another power
of appointment which under the applicable local law can be validly ex-
ercised" so as, among other things, to postpone vesting of interests in the
trust property for periods not restricted by the date of the creation of the
first power.
19. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 40(a) Para. 2.02 (1960).
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(c), 316(a)(2). The historical
explanation for this unusual tax rule, not germane to the present discussion,
is presented in BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 5.03, at 139 n.6 (1959).
21. E.g.. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 73(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.73-1(a)
(1961): "Compensation for personal services of a child shall, regardless
of the provisions of State law relating to who is entitled to the earnings
of the child .... be deemed to be the gross income of the child and not the
gross income of the parent of the child." See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 482, permitting artificial tax allocations of income and deductions.
2271961]
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Although Congress can go far in subordinating the role of local
law in the imposition of federal taxes, there may be some constitu-
tional limits to such congressional authority.22 In any event, for
most purposes congressional rejection of local concepts in favor of
expressed federal standards and criteria eliminates the problem
with which we are presently concerned.
C. IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO STATE LAW
The congressional definitions of the terms "income" and "divi-
dend" described above are clearly express adoptions or rejections of
local legal concepts. It must be admitted, however, that the com-
ments made so far concerning what is an "inheritance" and what is
a "gift," as those terms are used in the Code, may involve a severe
oversimplification. Although no one will quarrel with the proposi-
tion that the meaning of a term in a federal statute is a federal
question, still it is open to debate whether the terms mentioned
connote common law (and therefore state law) notions of inheri-
tances and gifts or whether Congress chose to give such terms a
special federal meaning unaffected by local custom and usage.
How should such debate be settled? The Supreme Court has sup-
plied a guide: "State law may control only when the federal taxing
act, by express language or necessary implication, makes its own
operation dependent upon state law."32
It may well be asked: Why, if state law creates interests and
rights and the federal taxing act taxes them, is there not a con-
tinuing presumption in favor of a reference to state law? Why lim-
it such reference to instances in which a necessary implication is
found? The uniformity doctrine is the answer.
Certainly it is reasonable to suppose that when Congress imposes
taxes on various transactions and events it intends that persons
similarly situated everywhere will be taxed alike. But to the extent
that tax liability is made dependent upon the varying legal con-
cepts applied in the several states, such like treatment will prob-
ably not follow.24 If this is kept in mind when the question of
"necessary implication" arises, correct answers are likely to be
forthcoming, and some seemingly divergent judicial decisions may
22. Sutherland, J., dissenting in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 684
(1933); cf. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
23. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). (Emphasis added.)
24. E.g., Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), dividing the income of
husband and wife in a community property state for federal tax purposes;
See PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 40 (2d Series 1938).
The problem is by no means confined to federal tax controversies. See
the divergent views of Harlan, J., writing for the Court, and Douglas, J.,
concurring, in De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), which arose
under the Copyright Act.
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be found to be harmonious after all.25 Some illustrations will aid
understanding.
The use of the term "inheritance" in a federal statute, when that
term is not specifically defined, does make, by necessary implica-
tion, the operation of the statute in part dependent on state law.
Only state law purports to establish one's status as heir and the
rights one has as such in the estate of another. Since such status
and rights cannot be established in any other way the necessary
implication is that Congress referred to state law on these matters.
But it is just as clearly not necessary to look to state law to see if
what one receives as a result of such status and rights is an "in-
heritance" within the meaning of the Code. Here, the uniformity
principle prevails so that persons whose heirship and rights and
circumstances of receipt are similar are treated alike without re-
gard to varying local attitudes and terminology.2"
When Congress taxes "gifts," it would be possible to administer
the statute on the basis of what is recognized as a gift locally, but
it is not necessary to do so. Again, however, local law should be
examined to see if there has been a transfer of an interest in
property from one to another." If a transfer is found to have oc-
curred, Congress prescribes whether the transfer meets the federal
gift concept without regard to varying local classifications.2"
In Burnet v. Harmel,29 the Supreme 'Court had to decide wheth-
er a bonus payment received by the lessor of oil and gas inter-
ests in Texas land, measured by the oil and gas produced, con-
stituted a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or rent.
In such a case the shifting of property interests of the parties to the
transaction is certainly governed by local law; but in deciding the
25. See KENNEDY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES§ 1.01 (1948).
26. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
27. E.g., in lanthe & Gabrielle Hardenbergh, 17 T.C. 166 (1951), affd,
198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), the Tax Court had to decide whether a re-
nunciation of an intestate interest amounted to a transfer of property so as
to constitute a gift for federal gift tax purposes. The Tax Court con-
cluded that it did, because under local law the interest had vested in the
one who purported to renounce it. Accord, William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C.
1589 (1952). But cf. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933), in which the court held there was no transfer
in contemplation of death for estate tax purposes, because the interest under
a will, which the decedent had renounced, had not vested.
28. But query, whether Congress should provide a special rule for re-
nunciations such as those in the Hardenbergh, Maxwell and Brown cases,
note 27 supra, regardless of locally identified transfers. See INT. REV. CODE
op 1954, §§ 2041(a) (2), 2514(b) expressly freeing the disclaimer or re-
nunciation of a power of appointment from estate and gift tax consequences
without regard to local rules on vesting.
29. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
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case the Fifth Circuit" went a step further and misapplied the
Morgan doctrine to treat the transaction as a sale of property, sup-
porting the taxpayer's contention that the bonus payment was
capital gain. The court reached this result on the ground that un-
der Texas law an oil and gas lease constitutes a sale of the oil and
gas in place. But is there a necessary implication that Congress re-
ferred to this facet of Texas law? Hardly. It was in this case that
the Supreme Court, reversing the Fifth Circuit, gave clear expres-
sion to the doctrine of necessary implication,31 saying also:
Here we are concerned only with the meaning and application of a
statute enacted by Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power under
the Constitution, to tax income. The exertion of that power is not
subject to state control. It is the will of Congress which controls, and
the expression of its will in legislation, in the absence of language
evidencing a different purpose, is to be interpreted so as to give a uni-
form application to a nationwide scheme of taxation [citing cases]. 32
Is it not both possible (as regards any necessary implication) and
desirable (as regards uniformity) to decide whether such a trans-
action should be accorded the special tax treatment afforded a sale
or exchange of property without regard to the way that Texas
views the transaction? The Court held the bonus payments were
subject to tax at ordinary income rates.
On the question whether state law controls,3 there is no in-
consistency between the Harmel case and Freuler v. Helvering.34
In the Freuler case, a trustee had distributed to income beneficiaries
the entire income of a trust without reduction for depreciation on
the trust res. The tax statute at the time taxed a beneficiary on
"that part of the income of the estate or trust . . . which . . . is
distributable to such beneficiary," pursuant to the instrument or
order governing distribution. 5 A basic question in the tax con-
troversy that ensued was whether the beneficiary was properly
taxed on the entire amount distributed, as contended by the Com-
missioner. The Supreme Court held the taxpayer was liable for tax
only on the amount properly distributed, which did not include
amounts reflecting depreciation on trust property because the ques-
tion of the amount distributable was a question of local law. This
is clearly correct; that is, if tax liability hinges on what is dis-
30. Harmel v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1932).
31. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
32. Ibid.
33. The question how state law is determined and applied is reserved
for consideration later in this discussion.
34. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
35. Rev. Act of 1921 § 219, 42 Stat. 246 (1921).
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tributable to a beneficiary, there is no federal law that supplies an
answer, and the necessary implication in the statute is a reference
to state law to determine what is distributable. It should be em-
phasized that the comments here go only to the question whether
state law is operative in such circumstances; there is more to say
later as to how such law is determined in cases of this sort.36 If
Congress says: "We shall tax you on what you have a right to,"
the Morgan doctrine takes over, the necessary implication is clear,
and notions of uniformity do not enter the picture at all.
In Blair v. Commissioner," the taxpayer who was the life bene-
ficiary of a testamentary trust assigned to his son and daughter
portions of his interest in the trust. The tax controversy developed
when the Commissioner asserted that the assignor continued to be
liable for tax on all the trust income. A ground for such conten-
tion would be the invalidity of the assignments, and the Commis-
sioner asserted that the assignments were invalid because the trust
was a spendthrift trust. On this aspect of the case, local law clearly
controls; no federal law purports to say what a trust beneficiary
can do with his interest and, if tax liability is to depend on the va-
lidity of his attempted assignments, the necessary implication is a
reference to local law. The Supreme Court so held, saying:
The question of the validity of the assignments is a question of local
law. The donor was a resident of Illinois and his disposition of the
property in that State was subject to its law. By that law the character
of the trust, the nature and extent of the interest of the beneficiary, and
the power of the beneficiary to assign that interest in whole or in part,
are to be determined.38
This is not completely determinative of tax liability in such a set-
ting, however. Two further questions remain: (1) How should it
be determined whether local law barred the assignments, or more
broadly, what court determines the local law that may control?
and (2) Even if the assignments were valid, are there neverthe-
less federal tax principles under which the assignor can continue
to be taxed on all the income, or more broadly, do federal tax
principles sometimes simply override seemingly controlling local
law? We approach the second question here and the first question
in the next part of this article.
36. See "The Determination of Local Law," pp. 234-51 infra.
37. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
38. Id. at 9.
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D. THE PENUMBRA
When Congress imposes a tax on income without express iden-
tification of the taxpayer, it seems almost axiomatic to say that in
each instance the one taxed is the one to whom the income be-
longs. Recalling the Morgan doctrine-that state law creates legal
interests and rights-we may be tempted too quickly to find, by
necessary implication, a reference to state law to determine own-
ership of the income and so to determine the proper taxpayer.
Thus, it comes as something of a shock to find that for tax pur-
poses the question: Whose income is it? is not invariably answered
by reference to locally determined right to the income in question,
even when Congress has not laid down express rules.
Problems concerning the proper taxpayer39 are directly trace-
able to our progressive tax rates.40 A flat tax rate, at least one
not rendered partially progressive by exemptions, would make it
largely immaterial who was taxed on an item of income. But pro-
gression invites fragmentation of income within family groups
which, in turn, poses a threat to the over-all plan and purpose of
the taxing statute. The question then comes down to this: In the
absence of express congressional direction, how far can and should
the federal courts go, in the name of the plan and purpose of the
taxing statute, to say to a taxpayer that he is to be taxed on in-
come which under local principles of law is not his? The conflicting
philosophies are easily identified: Does apparent necessary impli-
cation give way to somewhat less apparent over-all congressional
purpose? 1 This is not the place for extended treatment of this
question, although its close relationship to comments made above
compels some brief discussion.
In the celebrated case of Lucas v. Earl" the Supreme Court
side-stepped the question whether the taxpayer had the right to in-
come under local law by boldly interpreting the taxing statute as
taxing income to the one who earned it. So much for income de-
rived "from labor"; if the earning of, as opposed to the right to, the
39. The "whose income?" question is not the only penumbra problem,
e.g., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 928 (1952), but it is used for illustrative purposes.
40. See Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case For Progressive Taxation,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 431 (1952): "It is . . . progression which is
the true father of such distinguished precedents in taxation as Lucas v. Earl,
Corliss v. Bowers, Burnet v. Wells, Poe v. Seaborn, Helvering v. Clifford,
Helvering v. Horst, and Comm'r v. Culbertson." (Citations omitted.)
41. In Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239, 242 (8th Cir. 1945), the
court raises the question, among others: "whether the purposes of the
taxing act would be avoided or defeated by applying the State law."
42. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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income is the touchstone, who has the right to the income under
local law becomes immaterial. This has become a settled princi-
ple.43
There has been a somewhat parallel development with re-
gard to income "from capital." In general, the one who owns in-
come-producing property is taxed on the income produced, even
though he has effectively assigned to another his right to the in-
come." "The fruits are [not to be] attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew. '45 The statute does not raise the
simple question: Whose income is it? As interpreted, it asks who
owns the property that gave rise to the income. This is an unsettled
and unsettling principle. For here we are concerned, apparently,
with legal interests and rights created by state law-if not rights
in the income, at least rights in the property that produced it. And
yet the courts have been willing to join the Commissioner in the
creation of a federal tax concept of property ownership, which
sometimes operates in disregard of state law.
Time and experience have conditioned us to many aspects of
this matter. It no longer seems strained to say that the owner of
property who has effectively assigned the income from it to an-
other remains taxable on such income,-that is, to disregard the
legal right to the income as the basis for imposing the tax.46 But
problems continue to arise in attempting to say whether the as-
signee is a bare income assignee or whether he has become an
owner of an interest in the property so as to be taxed on the income
as his. These are matters of detail; but in some circumstances
in which it cannot be denied that the assignee has become an
owner of a property interest under local law and has an attend-
ing right to the income from his interest, the courts have still been
willing to say that he is not the proper one to pay the tax on such
income. This is the penumbra.
43. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Helvering v.
Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239 (8th
Cir. 1945); Parkford v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 249 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943); Rev. Rul. 55-2, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 211.
44. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Galt v. Commissioner, 216
F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954); Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952);
United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 934 (1952); Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1945);
Napoleon Palmieri, Jr., 27 T.C. 720 (1957); cf. White v. Fitzpatrick, 193
F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951).
45. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (19C0).
46. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
47. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); United States v. Shafto,
246 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1957).
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The Clifford case4' is the classic example. If one is the sole ben-
eficiary of an irrevocable short-term trust, all of the income from
which is distributable currently or ultimately to him, he certainly
has an ownership interest in the property and is the owner of the
income under local law. But such arrangements, usually intrafam-
ily, pose a threat to the effective working of a progressive rate
structure. From a policy point of view, one cannot seriously quarrel
with a desire to defeat such attempts to frustrate the federal tax
collector. But even before express statutory language Was added to
the Code, the courts dealt with this problem by effectively disre-
garding state law in circumstances in which it might well be ar-
gued that the necessary implication of the federal act was that state
law should control.4"
As a final word it should be stated that we are dealing with a
matter of interpretation of a federal statute, not a question of con-
gressional power. "It is the will of Congress which controls,"5
subject only to mild constitutional restraint. In the trust area, Con-
gress has now expressly repudiated reference to state law to de-
termine who is the tax owner of trust property. But it remains true,
in other areas in which the taxing statute does not purport to be
precise, that strong administrative and judicial notions of the plan
and purpose of the statute may result in incursions into the neces-
sary implication doctrine 1 expressed in the Harmel case.52
II. THE DETERMINATION OF LOCAL LAW
The phenomenon discussed in the preceding section-two sets
of laws concurrently applicable everywhere in the nation-is a nat-
ural consequence of a federal government possessing limited law-
making power composed of states with residual powers. As we have
seen, both sets of laws may bear on the same controversy; if state
law controls or affects a federal tax case, it must be determined and
48. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
49. This is why Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, castigated the Clifford
decision as judicial legislation. Id. at 338.
50. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
51. See, e.g., the divergent views of the Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals. In Estate of Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), the Tax Court
said: "The application of Federal taxing statutes to property interests is
not always determined by local law, and the statutory provisions governing
the question here are not dependent upon local law." Id. at 972. But in
Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949), the court
of appeals said: "It has long been established that what constitutes an in-
terest in property held by a person within a state is a matter of state law."
Id. at 658.
52. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
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applied before the federal question can be decided.5" But by
whom? That is our present question.
Just as state law creates legal interests and rights, so in our sys-
tem state courts have the final say as to what the state law is.54
Of the federal courts, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review a state court decision and, then, its appellate power extends
only to a review of federal questions.0 Of course, local issues
do arise in cases properly brought in the federal courts. Then, such
issues must be decided on the basis of the applicable state statutes
and, at least since Erie,56 the state common law. 7 Thus, in a fed-
eral tax case, if a local issue is presented the controversy must be
decided by a federal court, but the local issue must be decided in
conformance with state law with respect to which the state courts
predominate.
The dual system of courts, as opposed to a dual set of laws, is
not a natural consequence of a federal form of government. Indeed,
it would be perfectly possible to have a single court structure, fed-
53. The reverse situation sometimes arises in a non-tax setting. E.g., in
Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961), a share-
holder sued his corporation for a fraud upon the stockholders, resting his
claim on proxy irregularities that allegedly violated § 14 of the Federal
Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1958).
The court held that he had stated a cause of action under the Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958), and that the federal
court could determine the validity of the proxies, which would "greatly
affect the relief which will be available . . . under the local law of Mich-
igan." Id. at 214.
54. See West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35
(1934); see also, 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 8 (Wright Rev. 1960); 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.307 [1)
& [2] (2d ed. 1960).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958); STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE ch. 111 (1950).
56. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
57. It is sometimes suggested that the Erie doctrine applies only in diver-
sity cases. See 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 8, at 36 (Wright Rev. 1960). But the better view seems not to so limit
the doctrine. Ibid., and see BUNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 272 (5th ed. 1949); 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.305, at 3052 (2d ed. 1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941). However this may be, the need to ascertain the local
law, whether based on statutes or decisions, in deciding a federal tax case
was recognized before Erie, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937);
Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934), and the approach to local law in
such cases continues to be the same as in diversity cases. Estate of Spiegel
v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 78 (1940).
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eral5s or state (subject to national review)," which administered
all law, national and local.6" But, since we do not have such a
monolithic judicial system, we are faced with the problems dealt
with in this section.
The local issues on which federal tax liability depends may
arise for the first time in tax litigation in the federal courts. On the
other hand, the issues may have been adjudicated in the state courts
in litigation involving the persons whose tax liability is later brought
into question. How should the decision-maker in the tax case pro-
ceed in each of these situations? To attempt, as we do here, to an-
swer this question may be more a matter of bravado than of brav-
ery. Nevertheless, our attempt proceeds on two fronts. First, we
try, without complete success, to mark off a discernible path
through the present morass. Second, we offer, timorously, some
suggested minor changes that might circumvent the morass.
A. THE MoRAss
1. No Local Adjudication
If there has been no decision in the state courts on the rights
and interests of the parties in the tax case, unquestionably the
federal court can decide the local issues in disposing of the tax
contr9versy. When the jurisdiction of either a state court or of a
federal court is properly invoked, either court can generally decide
matters of state law or of federal law involved in the case, or of
both. Still there is an anomaly here. When a state court decides a
federal question, a method of review of that question in the federal
system is provided. 1 When a federal court decides a state law
question, no review in the state courts is available even though the
state courts generally have the final say as to such law.
On the other hand, while it is very rarely done, a federal court
faced with a state law issue in litigation properly before it can, at
least if the state concerned provides the necessary judicial ma-
chinery, suspend its proceeding pending a determination of the
58. E.g., India. See 1960-1961 THE STATEMAN'S YEARBooK 150.
59. E.g., Canada & Australia. See 1960-1961 THE STATEMAN'S YEAR-
BOOK 366, 464.
60. In the United States,
The federal judicial system is based upon the premise that the federaljudicial power cannot be entrusted to the state courts but requires a
separate organization of federal courts. Doubtless no other arrange-
ment was possible at the time when the federal judicial system was
inaugurated, since the states and the federal government were toojealous of each other to tolerate a unitary system.
Radin, Courts, IV ENcyc. Soc. ScI. 515, 527 (1931).
61. See note 55 supra.
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local issue in the state courts.62 Perhaps it is not clear that this op-
tion exists. In the Spiegel case,6" Mr. Justice Black speaking for
the majority said: "The record reveals that the state law problem
here is not an easy one, but under this Court's decision in Meredith
v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, the difficulty involved did not re-
lieve the Court of Appeals of its duty to make a decision."6
Conflicting expressions in the opinions concerning the option of
the federal court to refer a state issue to the state courts leave open
the question whether a federal court should interrupt a tax case to
await settlement of a local issue locally. We think it usually should
not.
Notwithstanding state-federal jealousies, federal judges are com-
petent to decide state law issues. Under our advocacy system, a
judge's personal knowledge of the law may be less important than
his judicial temperament and whether those who appear as counsel
before him have done a competent job. Even so, many federal
district court judges have been appointed to the bench from the
bar of the state in which they sit. Moreover, their physical presence
in the state gives them the kind of local orientation that state
judges have. We suggest later a different view concerning Court of
Claims and Tax Court judges who have less connection with local
matters, but there may be other reasons in favor of disposition of
the local issues in the tax proceeding that often override such
judges' lack of local orientation.
Perhaps a stronger reason for rejecting the appealing notion of a
reference to the state courts is the need to simplify litigation. Such
a reference would make two law suits out of one, and the sensible
trend in many areas of the law looks toward the elimination of
such multiplicity.65 Furthermore, if the trial court judge in the tax
62. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); see Frank-
furter, J., dissenting, in Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701
(1949), sub nom. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 673
(1949).
63. Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
64. 335 U.S. at 707. But see City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959), involving the validity of a state statute under
both state and federal constitutions.
65. E.g., the development of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); see Loss, The SEC
Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HRv. L. REv. 1249, 1284 (1960). The
development of the equity courts, and the widespread merger of law and
equity have been prompted by similar considerations. See Lord Mfg. Co.
v. Stimson, 73 F. Supp. 984, 989 (D.D.C. 1947):
If there was any advantage or disadvantage in the old separation
between the equity court and the court of law, it has been wiped out
by the elimination of the difference in the federal system. . . . Every
practical consideration supports the disposition of the controversy in
a single proceeding rather than in a multiplicity of suits.
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case does decide the local issues, it would seem very questionable
for an appellate court to remand for reference to the state court.
If such reference is not required by law, or even if it were, a liti-
gant might well feel aggrieved and generally hostile to our judicial
system to be told at an advanced appellate stage that he must go
back and start over.66
Still, especially when the local issue may be one of first impres-
sion in the state, or when local decisions in other cases leave the
law quite unsettled, the temptation is strong to defer to the ac-
knowledged expert; and the lack of opportunity for state court
review of the federal court's decision of the local issue gives fur-
ther pause. In a tax case hinging on whether a decedent had at
death a reversionary interest in property, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
even at the Supreme Court stage, urged a reference to the Illinois
courts in the name of "common sense"; saying: "If tax liability
is to hang by a gossamer thread, the Court ought to be sure that the
thread is there."6 7
Support for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view can be found in cases
in which subsequent state litigation has shown that the decision-
maker in the tax case has made a wrong guess on the state law
issue. The case of May Chandler Goodan s is illustrative. It pre-
sented a question whether stock dividends received by a trust were
taxable to the trust or to its income beneficiaries. Among other
things, the Commissioner rested his assertion of tax liability to
the beneficiaries on the proposition that under California law the
trust was revocable. The Tax Court decided this local law issue
against the Commissioner on the basis of Bixby v. California Trust
Company,69 an analogous case involving different parties which
had just been decided by the California District Court of Appeals.
But before the tax case appeal was perfected in the Ninth Circuit,
the California Supreme Court reversed Bixby,7" and the Tax
Court vacated its judgment. To be sure, the Tax Court found other
grounds to support the decision it had originally reached, and its
66. In Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), the
litigation had worked up through the district court and the court of ap-
peals only to be remanded to the district court pending proceedings to be
brought in a Connecticut court. When the case again came to the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, pointed out: "It has taken eight years
and eight courts to bring this battered litigation to an end." Id. at 614.
67. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335
U.S. 701 (1949), sub nom. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S.
632, 673 (1949).
68. 12 T.C. 817 (1949), affd per curiam, 195 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1952).
69. 190 P.2d 321 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
70. Bixby v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal. 2d 495, 202 P.2d 1018(1949).
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final decision was sustained by the court of appeals,71 but Judge
Fee wrote a blistering dissent contending that the whole matter
was proof that "local law should be left to the local courts . *."..2
In some circumstances, however, the state courts may not pro-
vide the machinery for decision of the local issues that arise in
the tax case.73 Moreover, if we assume general competence on the
part of federal judges (not as superior to state judges but as ex-
perienced decision-makers), the simplification of litigation accom-
plished by having all the issues decided in the tax tribunal seems
an adequate answer to some admitted difficulties that arise. In any
event, the "common sense" reference suggestion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has not gained acceptance and, subject to some quali-
fications suggested below, the present status of the law in this
respect should not be disturbed.
The preceding discussion indicates an inescapable conflict be-
tween two strong policies: (1) simplification in the administration
of justice and (2) local determination of local controversies. While
we take the position that the simplification policy should generally
prevail, the problem is certainly not one susceptible of categorical
answer. We suggest that the practice of deciding local issues in
the tax tribunal should be the invariable rule only in tax cases aris-
ing in the district courts. Since such courts have both general ju-
risdiction and local orientation and, indeed, may often be required
to decide local issues under their "diversity" jurisdiction, we see no
reason why they should not always proceed to decide all the issues
in a tax case. However, neither the Tax Court nor the Court of
Claims, the other courts of original jurisdiction in tax cases, has
either general jurisdiction or local orientation. In tax cases arising
in these courts, there are stronger reasons for a reference of state
issues to the state courts.7 4 We feel that the Tax Court and Court
of Claims should be recognized as having final discretion to decide
whether to refer the local issues, when possible, but that their dis-
71. May Chandler Goodan, 8 CCH TAx Cr. MEM. 1119 (1949), aff'd
per curiam, 195 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1952).
72. Id. at 500. For a discussion of recent Supreme Court decisions in-
volving the application of the federal court abstention doctrine in non-tax
cases, see Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D.
481 (1960).
73. In a recent estate tax case the court refers to the refusal of a state
court to construe a will on the ground that such construction should be
undertaken by the court deciding the tax controversy. United States v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 261 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1958), citing State v.
Merchants Nat'l Bank, 265 Ala. 375, 91 So. 2d 480 (1956).
74. See Fee, J., dissenting in Commissioner v. Goodan, 195 F.2d 498,
500 (9th Cir. 1952).
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cretion to do so should be exercised with restraint in the light of
the policy in favor of simplification.
The finality suggestion is made in the light of the thought ex-
pressed above that a person may legitimately feel aggrieved to be
told at an advanced appellate stage in litigation that he must go
back and start over, when this is not absolutely necessary. A re-
lated thought is that a taxpayer who has lost his tax case in the
trial court, and who therefore might wish to start again, should
not be accorded an opportunity to engage in forum shopping by
way of urging the appellate court to remand for reference of the
local issues to the state courts. 5
As regards the restraint to be exercised by the Tax Court and
the Court of Claims, neither court shows any particular reluctance
to decide local issues," and the restraint urged may accord with
present practice. If a suggestion is to be made as to when such
courts should seriously consider local reference, it might be done
on the basis of the question whether the local issue presents a dif-
ficult question of law or only a question, difficult or otherwise, of
fact. The approach might be: law sometimes, fact never. We fully
recognize that issues often cannot be so conveniently classified
and that the court may be faced at best with a mixed question of
law and fact.77 Nevertheless, if the relevant local doctrine is not
well established, 8 should the Tax Court or the Court of Claims
pretend to "find" the law or undertake otherwise to participate in
the shaping of the law of a state? As a minimum, identification of
local doctrinal confusion should be a factor weighing heavily in
favor of local reference by the Tax Court and the Court of Claims,
when that is possible.
75. E.g., Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949). Cur-
iously, a recent piece of state legislation that permits certification of local
law questions to a state supreme court authorizes such reference only by the
federal appellate courts. FLA. STAT. ch. 25, § 25.031 (1959); FLA. APP.
RULES 4.61 (Supp. Mar. 1961). Such certification at an advanced stage in
the tax litigation seems undesirable.
76. Martin v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 829 (1952); May Chandler
Goodan, 12 T.C. 817 (1949), reinstated, 8 CCH TAx Cr. MEM. 1119
(1949), affd per curiam, 195 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1952).
77. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); see Paul, Dobson
v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HAv. L. REv.
753 (1944). There may be uncertainty whether local law itself may be
viewed as raising a question of fact, Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation,
52 YALE L.J 799, 815 (1943), and if so we may wonder whether to
-differentiate "fact-fact" from "law-fact," Oliver, Federal Tax Significance
of State Law, 1953 So. CAL. TAX INST. 483, 486 n.11. Neither thought
lends much assurance to a state court reference policy based on the law
and fact dichotomy.
78. E.g., Goodan v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1952).
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If in a tax case the trial court (1) holds that local law affects or
controls the tax controversy and (2) undertakes to decide the lo-
cal issues, both matters are subject to review by the federal appel-
late courts. The first point is a pure federal question with respect
to which the scope of review is and should be unlimited.79 As re-
gards the second point, the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court should often rely on the lower federal courts' decisions. This
is the current attitude of the appellate courts. The Supreme Court
has said: "If reasonably avoidable we should certainly avoid be-
coming a Court of first instance for the determination of the varied
rules of local law prevailing in the forty-eight states.""0 And the
courts of appeals are inclined to defer to the district courts on such
issues.8 ' This is supportable on the basis of usual lack of local
orientation in the case of the courts of appeals 2 and the Supreme
Court as compared to the district courts. But the reason does not
extend to the Tax Court" or the Court of Claims.
Thus, with respect to review of the decision of state law issues
in federal tax cases, the following conclusions are indicated: (1)
The decision of a district court should rarely be disturbed by the
appellate courts; (2) The decision of the Tax Court should be
fully reviewed by the courts of appeals84 but, in such cases, the
79. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S.
188 (1938).
80. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 164- (1942). See also Huddleston
v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944): "The decision of the highest court
of a state on matters of state law are [sic] in general conclusive upon us,
and ordinarily we accept and therefore do not review, save in exceptional
cases, the considered determination of questions of state law by the
intermediate federal appellate courts. . . ." See also MacGregor v. State
Mut. Assur. Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942), in which the Court deferred
to a Michigan law decision by "a Michigan federal judge of long ex-
perience and by three circuit judges whose circuit includes Michigan."
81. E.g., Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954), on remand,
138 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. S. Dak. 1956) (estate tax); In re Glassman,
262 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1958) (bankruptcy); Woodhull v. Minot Clinic,
259 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1958) (rescission for stock fraud); I BARRON &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8, at 42 (Wright Rev.
1960).
82. But see Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 707-08(1949): "The . . . ruling was made by three judges who are constantly
required to pass upon Illinois law questions. One of the three judges has
long been a resident and lawyer of Illinois."
83. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 164 (1942): "Nor do we see
any reason why we should prefer the view of the Board of Tax Appeals
concerning Illinois law to that of the Circuit Court of Appeals within
which Illinois is embraced."
84. The courts of appeals have more local orientation and a broaderjurisdictional base than the Tax Court. See Estate of Spiegel v. Commis-
sioner, 335 U.S. 701, 707-08 (1949).
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Supreme Court should rarely disturb the court of appeals decision;
(3) Since Court of Claims decisions are not subject to review by
an intermediate appellate court, its decisions should be fully re-
viewed by the Supreme Court."
2. Prior Local Adjudication
The immediately preceding discussion concerns the determina-
tion and application of local law in a federal tax case when the
taxpayers involved in such case have not previously engaged in
state court litigation with respect to the local issues that control or
affect the tax controversy. We now assume that such local issues
have been the subject of state court proceedings. Thus, we finally
reach a point where one might reasonably expect fairly easy going.
The expectation stems from the following syllogism:
Major Premise: State law creates legal interests and rights. 86
Minor Premise: State courts determine and apply state law.8 7
Conclusion: Legal interests and rights are established by the de-
termination and application of state law by state
courts.8 8
The corollary is that, if interests and rights have been so establish-
ed, it remains for the federal court deciding the tax controversy
only to say how such interests and rights are taxed. 9 The cases
85. Although the Supreme Court may be no more locally oriented than
the Court of Claims, its obviously broader jurisdictional base seems to
support unrestricted review of local issues, notwithstanding its disin-
clination to be drawn into local law-making. See Helvering v. Stuart,
317 U.S. 154, 164 (1942). See also text accompanying note 80 supra.
86. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
87. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937): "The decision of the
state court upon these [local law] questions is final." Sharp v. Commis-
sioner, 91 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1937), rev'd per curiam 303 U.S. 624
(1938); Uterhart v. United States, 240 U.S. 598 (1916); Rhodes v.
Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 62 (1940), af'd sub nom. Helvering v. Rhodes'
Estate, 117 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1941). Throughout this discussion refer-
ence to prior adjudication under state law assumes litigation in the state
courts. It is possible of course that such prior adjudication has occurred
in the federal courts which can determine and apply state law under their
diversity jurisdiction. If so the prior decision in the federal court with
respect to legal interests and rights under state law should not be dif-
ferentiated from a prior state court decision.
88. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Uterhart v. United
States, 240 U.S. 598 (1916). See 1 PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION § 1.11 (1942).
89. The conclusive effect accorded a state court decision in a federal
tax case, when the state court decision is recognized as such, does not
flow from the doctrine of res judicata or its companion doctrine, collateral
estoppel, because the parties in the tax and local proceedings are not the
same. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 43 (1934). A thorough discus-
sion of the application of these doctrines in tax cases is presented in
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). Nor does the full
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reflect confusion as regards the major premise, the minor premise,
the conclusion and its corollary. Such confusion at the first two
stages can be eliminated by awareness of the problem and careful
analysis. Present doctrine does not afford a basis for eliminating
confusion as to the conclusion, but steps can be taken to reduce
such confusion. We adopt this syllogism as an outline for the en-
suing discussion.
(a) The Major Premise
This discussion began with a recognition that it is accurate to
say "State law creates legal interests and rights." But, as was also
observed, federal tax liability may not hinge on such interests and
rights. Thus, it is not sensible to discuss the controlling effect of a
state court decision if in the particular case state law does not con-
trol. A hypothetical and a concrete example will show the kind of
confusion that can arise here.
First, suppose in the celebrated Clifford case90 there had been a
local determination that Mrs. Clifford had a property interest in
the five year trust Mr. Clifford created for her and that the income
from the trust was hers. Whatever one may think of the Clifford
doctrine,9' if it is accepted as established tax law, Mrs. Clifford's
interests and rights under local law become irrelevant and the sug-
gested local determination simply would have no bearing on the
tax controversy. Obviously, confusion creeps in if the tax tribunal
concerns itself with the validity of a state court decision in such
circumstances when the local decision will not control or affect the
tax result, be it valid or not.
Second, an actual case illustrates such possible confusion, al-
though criticism should be modified by a recognition that the tax
controversy involved a family partnership and was decided before
faith and credit clause compel this result. Freuler v. Helvering, supra.
The doctrine of stare decisis, while applicable, obviously does not require
adherence to the prior local decision. However, the syllogism presented
in the text does compel adherence to the prior state court decision as a
general rule; troublesome exceptions are discussed further in the text.
90. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
93. In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the court, recognizing
the close family relationship between the grantor of the trust and its bene-
ficiary, the short duration of the trust, and administrative powers retained
by the grantor, viewed the arrangement as a mere temporary reallocation
of income within the family and refused to accord the trust tax recogni-
tion, regardless of its status under local law. Compare Commissioner v.
Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953), rejecting part of the so-called
"Clifford Regulations," Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.22(c)-21 (1945). This area
of the tax law is now controlled by express statutory provisions, INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78.
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the Supreme Court's Culbertson decision92 and the addition to the
Code of a family partnership provision." In Doll v. Commission-
er,94 a deficiency notice raised the question whether the taxpay-
er's business of selling shoes on a commission basis was a sole
proprietorship, so that all the income could be taxed to him, or
whether an asserted partnership between the taxpayer and his
wife should be recognized, so that part of the income could be
taxed to her. In support of his partnership argument, the taxpayer
relied in part on a decree by a Missouri court that Mr. and Mrs.
Doll had created a valid partnership in which they were equal part-
ners. 5 The Commissioner's cautious answer seems to have been
two-pronged:96 (1) The local decree was not material; and (2)
The local decree was not binding, even if material, because it was
a mere consent decree in a nonadversary proceeding. The Tax
Court rejected the decree on the basis of the Commissioner's sec-
ond ground.97 But, in affirming the Tax Court, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the local decree on the Commissioner's first ground:
We do not examine the issues as to the force of a judgment of an
inferior court or as to whether this was a consent judgment or collu-
sive or if either, its effect under the declaratory judgment law of
Missouri or under the national revenue statutes. We omit this because
we think this judgment is not decisive of this case.98
Hindsight, aided by the Supreme Court's Culbertson decision,99
indicates that in the Doll case the court of appeals took the cor-
rect stand. But, lest our immediate point be obscured by detail,
the significant thought is that the validity or acceptability of the
state court decree need never become an issue at all unless the ma-
jor premise in the suggested syllogism is relevant, that is, unless it
is correctly determined that within the suggested major premise the
rights or interests established by state law control or at least affect
the federal tax result.
92. In Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), the Supreme
Court undertook to lay down federal tax criteria for determining the
existence of a partnership and to reduce confusion generated by its earlier
decisions in Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946), and Lusthaus v.
Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946).
93. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 191 and 3797(a) (2), added by the
Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 340, 65 Stat. 511; INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 704(e).
95. See Francis Doll, 2 T.C. 276, 282 (1943).
96. Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 239, 241 (8th Cir. 1945).
97. Francis Doll, 2 T.C. 276, 284 (1943).
98. Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d at 241.
99. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
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(b) The Minor Premise
So much for confusion regarding the major premise. Difficulty
may arise under the minor premise-that state courts have the fi-
nal say as to the determination and application of state law-be-
cause of a failure to identify just what was decided by the state
court. Paradoxically, the best illustration of this can be found in an
opinion of the Third Circuit which, otherwise, is one of the most
enlightened and enlightening judicial treatments of the state law-
state decision problem in recent years. In Gallagher v. Smith,'
the question was whether the surviving wife of a decedent was
taxable on all the income from a testamentary trust created by his
will or whether she should be taxed only on a part, along with
other alleged beneficiaries of the trust. The question was one of in-
terests and rights under state law,' and there was a Pennsylvania
Orphans' Court decree concerning the administration of the trust.
The Third Circuit held that the decree established the rights of oth-
ers as beneficiaries and that the wife was taxable on only a part of
the income. But did it establish such rights?
The local adjudication in Gallagher arose out of an audit of the
trustees' accounts, so that "its confirmation might provide a basis
for the discharge of Louis Marion as a co-trustee under the will."'0 2
An argument on behalf of the taxpayer was that she had disclaim-
ed all but a one-thirteenth interest in the trust which left her with
that interest and no more. The Government argued, on the other
hand, that the disclaimer should be viewed as only a revocable
assignment, because the trust was a spendthrift trust. Under Penn-
sylvania law an interest in a spendthrift trust cannot be irrevocably
assigned. There was no doubt that the taxpayer remained taxable
on all the trust income if her disclaimer amounted only to a revo-
cable assignment. More precisely, then, the question was whether
the decision of the Pennsylvania Orphans' Court determined the
irrevocable nature of the assignment. The majority of the Third
Circuit, and the Commissioner as well, viewed the local decree as
a determination that there had been an irrevocable assignment,
the Commissioner contending, however, that the decree was not
binding. With due deference, the view of Judge Kalodner, dissent-
ing, seems sounder than the majority view. He said: "The [Or-
phans'] Court merely held that the plaintiff could assign her in-
come to her children and that this assignment would continue to
100. 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
101. There were no factors present that would bring the case into the
penumbra, discussed in text accompanying notes 39-52 supra.
102. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 1955).
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be effective until withdrawn.'' 1 3 Seemingly, this was all the Or-
phans' Court had to say to sustain the account0 4 and, if so, its
decree was not a local decision that the taxpayer had irrevocably
assigned an interest in the trust.
For present purposes we need not reach a final position on
whether Judge Kalodner or the majority took the proper view of
the local decree. The point is that even if state law controls, and
even if there is a local decision, still the case is one in which
there is no binding local adjudication, unless within the suggested
minor premise the local decision settles the very rights and interests
on which federal tax liability depends. This is what we mean by
possible confusion at the "minor premise" stage.105 If the wrong
step is taken here it leads to the "conclusion" stage where confusion
under present doctrine is inherent. That is, the court in Gallagher
would not have reached (and perhaps should not have reached)
the question whether they were bound by the local decree if they
had decided, as Judge Kalodner did, that "the Orphans' Court
did not purport . . . to adjudicate property rights . . .,,..
(3) The Syllogistic Conclusion
Forgive us Artistotle if we wonder whether in this tax area of
the law, this area of "quasi-knowledge,"'07 a sound major prem-
ise and a sound minor premise may not lead invariably to a sound
conclusion. Or should we wonder instead whether Aristotelian
logic, something like the electronic brain, is only as good as the
premises that are fed into it?
The broad proposition seems to be that: (1) when state law
creates the legal interests and rights upon which tax liability ad-
mittedly depends, and (2) when a state court has made final de-
termination of those interests and rights as regards the very par-
ties in the tax case, still (3) the federal court can sometimes dis-
regard that determination and decide the tax controversy on the
basis of its own determination of such interests and rights. This
seems illogical; our suggested syllogism indicates that the federal
103. Id. at 228.
104. See id. at 226 n.11, where the court quotes the questions pre-
sented to the Orphans' Court.
105. The problem may be pointed up by reference to Cook, Scientific
Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303, 305 (1927), as quoted in
MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 82 n.67 (1960): "We
may say that 'all gostaks are doshes' and that 'all doshes are galloons' and
conclude with strictest logic that 'all gostaks are galloons' and still not
know what we are talking about."
106. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 228 (3d Cir. 1955).
107. KENNEDY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES§ 1.01, at 3 (1948).
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court can decide only how such interests and rights established by
the state court are taxed. But it is not illogical if in the federal tax
case there is a sound basis for the federal court to say that the
state court has not really made a final determination of such in-
terests and rights, that is, if the federal court can properly say
that the state decision is something other than what it appears to
be. The attack, then, is not on Aristotle; the question instead is:
When is a state court decision not a decision? The imprimatur of
a state judge may not be the true hallmark of a state decision.
When is this so?
We think a proper distillation of the variant expressions in the
cases is that a state court decision of local issues germane to a fed-
eral tax controversy must be accorded full recognition by the tax
tribunal if it is an adjudication of the local issues on the merits.108
By this we mean that a federal judge requested to accord full rec-
ognition to a state court decision should consciously ask himself
this question: Did the parties in the state proceeding invoke the
function of the state judiciary in such a way that the state judge
has actually gone about his usual business of interpreting state law
in the light of facts fairly presented to reach and express a con-
clusion as to the interests and rights of the parties? If so, as the
Supreme Court has said: "To derogate from the authority of that
conclusion and of the decree it commanded, so far as the question
is one of state law, would be wholly unwarranted in the exercise
of federal jurisdiction."'0 9 The question whether the state court
decision is such as to compel full recognition is a federal ques-
tion.°10
The origin of the suggested test for recognition of a local de-
cision in a subsequent tax case is very general language in two
Supreme Court opinions, both according full recognition to a local
decree. In Freuler v. Helvering,"' the Court expressly rejected the
contention that the state suit was "collusive" or the decree a mere
"consent decree." Similarly, in Blair v. Commissioner,"12 the Court
found no basis for saying "that the suit was collusive and the de-
108. See 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAxATION
§ 10.10, at 631 (1959). After suggesting that the court must have had
jurisdiction and that the decree must be binding on the parties, Mertens
indicates that "the adjudication must have 'passed upon' the merits .
for the state decision to qualify as binding.
109. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 10 (1937).
110. In Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), and Freuler v. Hel-
vering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934), the Supreme Court considered whether the
state court decisions involved were required to be accorded full recogni-
tion and decided that they were.
111. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
112. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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cree inoperative.""' 3 It is a reasonable inference that the Court
would not have accorded recognition to a decree obtained in a col-
lusive suit or possibly to a consent decree." 4 But there are no
later Supreme Court tax opinions that eliminate lurking uncer-
tainty, and in this context the term "collusive" may have quite a
special meaning.
Discussion of the problem in opinions of the lower federal
courts is as profuse as such discussion is scarce in the Supreme
Court opinions. It is difficult to escape the feeling that subordinate
tests for recognition, suggested by the lower courts within the
loose framework of the Supreme Court pronouncements, rarely
rise above the verbalistic level. But it would be tautological to
undertake here a thorough cruise of this judicial timber. A very
recent edition of an outstanding tax treatise" 5 presents a compre-
hensive collection of many relevant decisions and commentaries,
together with analysis and comment on the development of this
area of the law. The difficulty is that such analysis leads only to
the view we have suggested as the proper test for conclusiveness
of a state court decision," 6 and this test cannot be expressed in
any way that makes its application anything better than uncertain
in most cases.
A clear illustration of a state decision that does not meet the
test for recognition is found in Martin v. United States."7 There
the decedent was the life beneficiary of a testamentary trust un-
der which, upon her death, the remainder was to pass to her
heirs. A New York Surrogate had held that the decedent life bene-
ficiary had, at death, no interest in crops that had been harvested
from trust farming properties. The Court of Claims rejected the
estate's contention that this local determination barred inclusion of
the value of the crops in the decedent's gross estate and held such
value includible under its own interpretation of New York law.
Regardless of possible collusion, disregard of the local decision is
fully supportable on the ground that it was without local signifi-
cance: "the same persons got the property, whether they took as
heirs of Elizabeth Smith [the life beneficiary] or as remaindermen
under the will of Hiram Sibley [the settlor of the trust]."" 8 In
such a setting the asserted state decision can be viewed as little
113. Id. at 10.
114. But see Commissioner v. Blair, 83 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1936),
rev'd, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
115. 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §§
10.15-10.17 (1959).
116. Id. § 10.10, at 631; see note 108 supra.
117. 121 Ct. Cl. 829 (1952.)
118. Id. at 845.
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more than an advisory opinion on the federal tax question, which
the federal court should feel free to take or leave alon6.119
The Martin case reflects a sound decision based on a sound
expressed reason, but the court there also said: "There was, there-
fore, no adversary litigation . *...,, While true, adversariness
or the lack of it is one among many spurious tests suggested for en-
forced recognition of the state decision. The court of appeals dealt
deftly with this proposition in the famous Blair litigation:121
We would be better satisfied if the suit in the state court had been
more adversary in its nature .... But consent decrees are binding if
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction with the parties properly
before it, in the absence of a showing of collusion between the parties
or fraud upon the court. 22
While rejecting adversariness as a test, it is interesting to note
that the court of appeals expressly acknowledged collusion and
fraud upon the court as grounds for rejection of a state decision.
Collusion, as used here and by the Supreme Court in the same
case, 1 3 is an uncertain concept,2'- adding nothing to the test
we have suggested. Fraud, too, is an elusive concept, but there may
be a reasonably well defined area in which a judgment is vulner-
able to attack by one who was not a party to the proceeding. =5
At least in such cases, fraud should be a clear basis for rejecting
the state court decision as not a controlling adjudication of inter-
ests and rights.
The fact that a few problems in this area can be whittled down
to rule-of-thumb proportions is no indication that we can escape
complexity. Even with the benefit of hindsight, the proper view
119. Even if a state court decision need not be treated as binding, the
federal court may be inclined to view it as persuasive or else find in it
confirmation of its own determination, if that happens to accord with the
result reached locally. Channing v. Hassett, 200 F.2d 514 (lst Cir. 1952).
Moreover, the effect of a state court decision may depend very much on
whether the issue in the tax case involves the interests and rights of the
parties at a point of time before the state decision was rendered, or only
prospectively. Rejected for the first purpose, it may still be accepted for
the second. M. T. Straight Trust, 24 T.C. 69 (1955), a/fd sub nom.
Straight's Trust v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1957).
120. 121 Ct. Cl. 829, 845 (1952). (Emphasis added).
121. Commissioner v. Blair, 83 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1936), rev'd on
other grounds, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); see also Gal-
lagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 1955): "whether the proceed-
ing was adversary or nonadversary is not the test of conclusiveness ... .
122. Commissioner v. Blair, 83 F.2d at 657.
123. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
124. See Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1952).
125. See 30A AM. JuR. Judgments § 18 (1958).
1961] 249
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of the local litigation in the celebrated Blair case itself is at best
controversial. How should the following factors be appraised?
There is that which suggests a friendly suit to avoid taxes, to which
there was no opposition or adverse party. All who joined in the litiga-
tion were desirous of obtaining the same end-the avoidance of a
large part of the Federal income tax through division of the income
by the beneficiary among his children. The Government was not a
party to that suit. The suit was prosecuted only until a favorable de-
cision was reached and then no appeal was taken. The first court
ruled adversely to the complainants. On appeal a favorable decree was
entered. There was no one interested in taking the case to the Illinois
Supreme Court and the litigation ceased. In other words it was not
unlike a consent decree.'2 6
Would the Tax Court (then B.T.A.), the Seventh Circuit, and the
Supreme Court now all agree, as they did then, that the state court
decree was binding on the local issues? One wonders.
We identified earlier the characteristics of a morass when a tax
case arises in which local interests and rights have not been the
subject of prior local adjudication. Disappointingly, we now con-
clude that these characteristics persist even when there has been
prior local litigation seemingly settling the local issues.
B. ESCAPE FROM THE MORASS?
We do not believe that any imaginable refinement or elaboration
of or change in existing doctrine can chart a clear path through
the state decree morass that we have been discussing. It is relevant
therefore to ask whether there may be a way around it. Are there
procedural, as opposed to doctrinal, changes that might reduce
controversy and uncertainty? Others have been here before us.1
27
One procedural thought that we think is properly rejected seems
to assume that, if the Commissioner is an uninvited guest at a fam-
ily gathering, he can be made to wash the dishes. By statute, at
least, the Commissioner could be required, upon notification of
pending state litigation that would affect tax liability, either: (1)
to intervene in such litigation to protect the revenue or (2) if he
did not intervene, to accept the results without regard to the usual
tests for recognition. Whenever such notification was given, the
doctrinal difficulties suggested above would be eliminated. Unfor-
tunately, however, the notion is not practicable. Others seem to
126. Commissioner v. Blair, 83 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1936).
127. See Colowick, The Binding Effect of a State Court's Decision in a
Subsequent Federal Income Tax Case, 12 TAx L. REv. 213, 229 (1957);
Cardozo, Federal Taxes and The Radiating Potencies of State Court De-
cisions, 51 YALE L.J. 783, 796 (1942).
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agree.12 8 Not only would it require impossible forecasting by both
private parties and the Commissioner but, if the revenue were in
fact to be protected under such a plan, a very heavy burden would
be placed upon Treasury or other Government attorneys. The
Treasury Department, probably in part for the reasons indicated,
has rejected this procedure. 9
CONCLUSION
We believe there are workable procedural alternatives that could
be adopted by statute without change in present doctrine, which
would lead toward smoother adjudication of tax controversies pre-
senting difficult local issues. We present these suggestions, ac-
knowledging their skeletal nature, with respect to each of the
three tax tribunals of original jurisdiction.
A. THE TAX COURT
When in a Tax Court proceeding there is drawn in question the
validity or acceptability of a state court decision, the Tax Court
judge should be required to invite to sit with him on the case a
district judge for the district in which the hearing is being or is to
be held. 3 ' The district judge should sit only as an advisor to the
Tax Court, but he should have the privilege of writing a dissenting
opinion in any case in which the Tax Court decision on the binding
effect of the local decision, or the resolution of the local law issue,
if the local decision is held not binding, is at variance with his
advice.
In this fashion, both the technical tax expertise of the Tax
Court judge and the general local expertise of the district judge
would be brought to bear on the decision of the tax controversy.
While the district judge selected from the district where the case
is being heard may not invariably be geographically associated
with the local law involved in the case, administrative convenience
seems to dictate such choice.
We believe that much the same procedure should be followed
when in a Tax Court proceeding an issue of local law arises with
respect to which there has been no prior local adjudication, ex-
cept that the invitation to the district judge to participate should be
discretionary with the Tax Court judge. We take account here of
128. Ibid.
129. Mim. 6134, 4 CCH 6137 (1947).
130. The procedure suggested might be facilitated by altering the
status of the Tax Court from an administrative agency to a tax division
of the district court.
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the fact that local issues vary greatly as to complexity, 3' and
suggest that the Tax Court judge would not extend this invitation
when such issues were routine.
B. COURT OF CLAIMS
When in a Court of Claims refund suit there is drawn in ques-
tion the validity or acceptability of a state court decision, the
court should be required to dismiss the proceeding and the tax-
payer should be permitted promptly, but without regard to usual
limitation periods, to resume his suit in the appropriate district
court.'3 2 We think such outright reference is preferable to the
advisory arrangement suggested for the Tax Court because, in con-
trast to the Tax Court, the Court of Claims has no particular tax
expertise that would justify its retention of the suit and because the
refund nature of a suit in the Court of Claims makes it the kind of
suit also brought in the district courts.
We believe that much the same procedure should be followed
in a Court of Claims refund suit when an issue of local law arises
with respect to which there has been no prior local adjudication, 33
except that the dismissal of the suit should then be discretionary
with the Court of Claims. Again we take account of the variation
in the complexity of local issues.' 3'
C. DISTRICT COURT
We suggest no change here with respect to the treatment of
local issues and local decisions in tax cases because, as we have
indicated, we feel the district courts are in the best position to cope
with such issues. However, we venture one related suggestion.
131. Compare May Chandler Goodan, 12 T.C. 817 (1949), aff'd sub
nom. Commissioner v. Goodan, 195 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1952) (complex
state law issue) with Erik Krag, 8 T.C. 1091 (1947) (routine application of
state statute).
132. There may be numerous reasons why a litigant would prefer to
prosecute a refund suit in the Court of Claims instead of bringing such a
suit in the district court. See 3 CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 11.54
(1955); BICKFORD, SUCCESSFUL TAx PRACTICE 293 (3d ed. 1956). Never-
theless, we need not question whether the Court of Claims should have
any tax jurisdiction to reject such preference as a reason against adoption
of the procedure suggested.
133. Admittedly, in either of the circumstances suggested, the reference
could be to the appropriate state court rather than to the federal district
court. We reject the state court alternative because of uncertainty regarding
the availability of state court procedures, confidence in the ability of federal
district judges, a desire to avoid multiplicity of suits, and related considera-
tions more fully expressed elsewhere in this discussion.
134. See note 131 supra.
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We believe that, when in a refund suit in the district court there
arises a federal tax issue of unusual complexity, the district judge
in his discretion should be permitted to invite a Tax Court judge
to sit with him on the case. The Tax Court judge should sit only
as an advisor to the district judge, but he should have the privilege
of writing a dissenting opinion in any case in which the district
court decides the tax issues at variance with his advice.
While these suggestions would probably make necessary the ap-
pointment of some additional Tax Court and district court judges,
we believe it is sensible to propose a two-judge court for two-prob-
lem cases. Moreover, we believe the suggestions have some advan-
tages with respect to review of federal tax cases. For in cases that
have been heard by both a Tax Court and a district court judge,
and in which the judge sitting as advisor did not dissent, the ap-
pellate court should show more than usual reluctance to disturb
the initial decision. On the other hand, a Tax Court judge's ad-
visory dissent on a tax issue or a district judge's advisory dissent
on a local issue might be given considerable weight in an appellate
proceeding.
The suggestions made here are not necessarily incompatible with
giving the state courts the final say on issues of local law in a way
they sometimes do and sometimes do not have under present pro-
cedures. If it is thought their participation should be assured, per-
haps the best way to implement this desire is to split the appellate
procedure in tax cases hinging in part at least on local law. Pro-
vision might be made for the review of the local issues in the high-
est courts of the states.. 5 and for suspension of the review of the
federal issues in the federal appellate courts until completion of
such state proceedings. As previously indicated, we question the
need for such a procedure but, if review by the state courts were
discretionary with them, as we feel it certainly should be, it seems
doubtful the review procedure in the state courts would often be-
come a reality.
135. Perhaps this is a matter for consideration by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. A recent Florida statute, FLA. STAT. oh. 25, §
25.031 (1959), while not aimed at the suggested review procedure,
indicates the manner in which this could be accomplished. See Clay v.
Sun Ins. Offices, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960), in which questions certified to
the Supreme Court of Florida by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
were decided by the Florida Supreme Court on October 18, 1961. Tampa
Tribune, Oct. 19, 1961, p. 18, col. D. Although that statute looks toward
certification only from federal appellate courts, the local high courts would
not have to fear being overburdened if their review of local issues arising
in tax cases were discretionary with them. It may be that federal legislation
would also be required to give finality to the judgment of the state court in
an unusual review procedure such as this.
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